

The Cambridge Companion to
DELEUZE

Edited by

Daniel W. Smith

Purdue University

and

Henry Somers-Hall

Royal Holloway, University of London

ROSI BRAIDOTTI

8 Nomadic ethics

INTRODUCTION

Deleuze's engagement with ethics – both his specific monographs on Spinoza's thought and the more extensive engagement with the ethical implications of affirmative nomadic ontology throughout his work – constitutes the core of his philosophy. This claim needs to be contextualized from the outset in two ways. Firstly, Deleuze's ethics of freedom and affirmation offers a robust reply to the *doxa*-driven belief that any attempt at challenging or decentering the traditional, universalistic view of the moral subject can only result in moral and cognitive relativism. This intellectually lazy position enjoys high popularity in the current global climate of political conservatism, which paradoxically rejoices in public display of interest in moral values and has branded new forms of bio-ethics, corporate ethics, media ethics, and so forth. This quantitative proliferation of ethical brands in the age of advanced capitalism leaves untouched the qualitative issue of what constitutes the core of an ethical subject. Against the common-sense belief that only steady identities resting on firm grounds of rational and moral universalism can guarantee basic human decency, moral and political agency, and ethical probity, Deleuze's philosophy proposes a post-humanistic but robust alternative through his nomadic vision of the subject. My argument in this essay is that such a vision can provide an alternative foundation for ethical subjectivity that respects the complexity of our times while avoiding the pitfalls of postmodern and other forms of relativism.

Secondly, there is a contextual consideration: Deleuze's innovative neo-Spinozist ethical strand strikes a distinctly affirmative note in relation to the rest of the poststructuralist generation. The following

discursive alignments can be seen at present in poststructuralist ethical thought. To start with: the later Foucault has produced a form of residual Kantian thought that stresses the importance of bio-politics and bio-political citizenship as a form of moral accountability. Nicholas Rose and Paul Rabinow, for instance, focus on the notion of "Life" as *bios*, that is to say, as an instance of governmentality that is as empowering ("potentia") as it is confining ("potestas") and functions as the circulation of power effects.¹ The ethical instance is located accordingly in the inter-rational accountability of a bio-ethical subject in process that aims at stylizing alternative practices of social and personal connection and intimacy.

Giorgio Agamben also takes off from Foucault's unfinished project and mixes it with Heidegger's work on finitude and Schmidt's antagonistic notion of the political to produce a scathing indictment of the moral grounds and the political practice of modernity.² In this strand, "Life" is quite central too, but it is defined as extreme ontological vulnerability: it is that which sovereign power harps upon in order to erect and sustain its necro-political governmentality. For, Agamben, "bare life," that is to say "zoe" – non-human or pre-individual life – is contiguous with Thanatos or death. The vitality of the subject ("zoe") is identified with his perishability (the gender is not a coincidence) and with his propensity for homicidal extinction. Bio-power here means Thanatos-politics.

A third and ethically more hopeful coalition stems from the Levinas–Derrida tradition of ethics. This is centered on the relationship between the subject and Otherness – symbolized by the other's face.³ It also stresses ontological connection and the indebtedness to the demands of others,⁴ the non-negotiable nature of "justice" and "hospitality," as well as the permanence of mourning.⁵ The emphasis falls on vulnerability as the defining feature of the human as the potential capacity to be wounded and hence to require the care, solidarity, and love of others. Respect for vulnerability is therefore the basis of the ethical human relation. There is a clear political side to this, insofar as sovereign power has the right as well as the means to legislate on survival and extinction. Ethics consequently cuts two ways: on the public side it calls into question the foundational violence of such a system and is thus intrinsically political. On the private side, it also inscribes issues of pain and cruelty at the core of the ethical interaction. I shall return to the question of pain below.

Deleuze's neo-Spinozist ethics, on the other hand, chooses a different emphasis, which rests on an active relational ontology. Deleuze's neo-vitalism refers to Nietzsche and Spinoza but updates them both to different contextual and conceptual concerns.⁶ Otherness is approached as the expression of a productive limit, or generative threshold, which calls for an always already compromised set of negotiations. Nomadic theory prefers to look for the ways in which Otherness prompts, mobilizes, and allows for flows of affirmation of values and forces which are not yet sustained by the current conditions. Insofar as the conditions need to be brought about or actualized by collective efforts to induce qualitative transformations in our interactions, it requires the praxis of affirmative ethics.

Deleuze's life-oriented philosophy of becoming differs profoundly from Levinas' and Derrida's emphasis on the incommensurable presence of the Other. They inscribe the totality of the Self's reliance on the other as a structural necessity that transcends the "I" but remains internal to it. Deleuze's immanence, on the other hand, firmly locates the affirmation in the exteriority, the cruel, messy outside-ness of Life itself. Creative chaos is not chaotic – it is the virtual formation of all possible forms (*LS*). Life is not an a priori that gets individuated in single instances, but it is immanent to and thus coincides with its multiple material actualizations. The middle/milieu is always the site of birth and emergence of the new – life itself. I refer to this generative force as *zoe*, which is the opposite of Agamben's "bare life" in that it is a creative force that constructs possible futures.

To conclude this brief comparative survey: the bio-political and bio-power are only the starting points for an ethical reflection about the politics of life itself as a relentlessly generative and not exclusively human force. Contrary to the Heideggerians, the emphasis here is on generation, vital forces, and a culture of affirmation. Contrary to the Kantians, the ethical instance is not located within the confines of a self-regulating subject of moral agency, but rather in a set of interrelations with both human and inhuman forces. These forces can be rendered in terms of immanence and relationality (Spinoza), duration (Bergson), transmutation of the negative (Nietzsche), but are all indexed on the project of forging ethical sustainability? The notion of the non-human, in-human, or post-

human emerges therefore as the defining trait of nomadic ethical subjectivity. These concepts will constitute the backbone of the rest of my essay.

ETHICAL PREMISES

The point in common to all poststructuralist philosophies is that ethics is not confined to the realm of rights, distributive justice, or the law. It rather bears close links with the notions of political agency, freedom, and the management of power and power relations. Issues of responsibility are dealt with in terms of alterity or the relationship to others, as processes of intensive becoming. This implies accountability, situatedness, and the composition of common planes of active collaborative ethical conduct.⁸ A Deleuzian position, therefore, far from thinking that a liberal individual definition of the subject is the necessary precondition for ethics, argues that liberalism at present hinders the development of new modes of ethical behavior.

In other words, for nomadic thought, the proper object of ethical enquiry is not the subject's universalistic or individual core – his/her moral intentionality, or rational consciousness – as much as the effects of truth and power that his/her actions are likely to have upon others in the world. This is a kind of ethical pragmatism, which defines ethics as the practice that cultivates affirmative modes of relation, active forces, and values. It is also conceptually linked to the notion of embodied materialism and to a non-unitary vision of the subject. Ethics is therefore the discourse about forces, desires, and values that act as empowering modes of becoming, whereas morality is the implementation of established protocols and sets of rules (*EPS*). Philosophical nomadism shares Nietzsche's distaste for morality as sets of negative, resentful emotions and life-denying reactive passions. Deleuze joins this up with Spinoza's ethics of affirmation to produce a very accountable and concrete ethical line about joyful affirmation.

The precondition for the constitution of an ethical subject is for nomadic theory the immanent, materially embedded and yet vitalist or dynamic structure of all entities – human and non-human. Deleuze does take "Life" as the point of reference, but this vital force is *zoe* defined as the non-human, generative, trans-individual

and post-anthropocentric dimension of subjectivity. This results in an affirmative project that stresses positivity and not only vulnerability and in a very close link between ethics and an eco-philosophy or common ecologies of belonging.

This monistic ontology – inspired by Spinoza's notion of ontological desire or *conatus* – entails a horizontal organization of different categories of beings defined as actualizations of different forces, speeds, and materialities (bodies without organs). As a result, hierarchical levels and hegemonic differences are rejected and replaced by the renewed emphasis on the 'situated' nature of all entities – a common plane of immanence. This emphasis on the middle/ the milieu is the premise for the radical relationality of nomadic subjectivity. The middle is a point, any point, which by definition challenges the notion of a fixed center, a matrix of power or a hierarchical core. These vertical notions constitute the backbone of the traditional notion of the transcendent nature of power, which Deleuze – with Guattari – is committed to undoing. They replace it with a flat ontology of immanent relations of mutual constitution through a transversal, collective rhizomatic web of relations. These ensure mutual specification and are therefore post-individualistic in a productive manner. The emphasis on immanence also sets the threshold for the actualization of intensive or virtual becomings and for the composition of collective assemblages that sustain the project of actualizing them. This transformative, relational project lies at the core of Deleuze's ethics.

This is not to say that the issue of pain and vulnerability is not raised, but rather that it is not lifted to an ontological dimension. If it is indeed the case that radical immanence instills an open ecology of *zoe*-centered egalitarianism,⁹ then vulnerability is another name for being-there and being-in-relation to others. Openness to others is an expression of the nomadic relational structure of the subject and a precondition for the creation of ethical bonds. The emphasis therefore falls not so much on vulnerability as on the immanent structure of a subject – an entity, or a body's – capacity to affect and be affected – in pleasure as in pain – and to express multiple forms of intensity. This implies the ability to cultivate, establish, and sustain empowering relations as well as the commitment to the production of the social conditions that are conducive to transform the negative instance, including hurt and pain, into affirmative and

productive ethical relations. Nomadic theory embraces this ethical relation by proposing a materially embodied and embedded, but ontologically vital and self-organizing notion of matter. In the case of humans this immanent materiality gets actualized through a rhizomic expanse of interrelations which flow transversally across all entities, over and against the hierarchical forms of normativity and traditional modes of containment of the other supported by mainstream moral thought.

BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM

The ethical subject in a nomadic perspective lies at the intersections with external, relational forces: it is about assemblages. Encountering them requires a careful selection and composition of factors: the frame of orientation, the points of contact and entry into a relation, the constant unfolding of the relation to the multiple others that constitute our environment/milieu. In this field of transformative forces, sustainability is a very pragmatic ethical practice that provides some homeostatic stability to the subject's ethical compass. It actualizes the productive elements of the subject's intensive nature: affectivity is the propensity for changes or transformation that is directly proportional to the subject's ability to sustain the shifts without cracking. The border, the framing or containing practices are crucial to Deleuze's neo-Spinozist ethical project, one which aims at affirmative and not nihilistic processes of becoming, which means joyful-becoming as *potentia*, or a radical force of empowerment. Genevieve Lloyd, in her commentary on Spinoza, explains how such a vitalistic and positive vision of the subject is linked to an ethics of passion that aims at joy and not at destruction.¹⁰ She carefully points out the difficulties involved in approaching Spinoza's concept of ethics as "the collective powers and affinities of bodies."¹¹ She stresses the advantages of approaching these potencies of embodied subjects in terms of the ethology proposed by Deleuze, insofar as it challenges the centrality of the notion of the individual and replaces it with an ethical commitment to social values conducive to a collectively well-functioning system.

Thus, selection is involved: the composition of the forces that propel the subject, the rhythm, speed, and sequencing of the relations

and affects as well as the selection of the constitutive elements are the key criteria. This has nothing to do, however, with the argument for choice and individual free will. Quite on the contrary, it establishes collective and transversal relations as the core ethical agency. Moreover, stability is also involved: the actualization of affirmative ethical relations is the effect of adequate dosage, while it is also simultaneously the prerequisite for sustaining those same forces. The subject is an affective entity; *conatus* defined as a "striving" without an agent in control of it. The founding ethical desire of this subject is to be worthy of a life force that intersects with all that moves and exists. Far from being the case that the individual possesses or controls such a force, it is rather the case that being a subject consists in partaking in such a striving in a collaborative model of relation to others. In all these respects, the nomadic ethical subject defeats relativism at each step of its actualization.

The notion of the individual is enlarged to enclose a structural sense of interconnection between the singular self and the environment or totality in which it is embodied and embedded. Lloyd defines this interconnectiveness not as a synthesis, but rather as a series of "nested embeddings of individuals."¹³ According to this enlarged sense of the individual, an inward-looking understanding of the individual self is not only an error, but also a cognitive and an ethical misjudgment. The inward-looking individual fails to see the interconnection as part and parcel of his/her nature, and is thus inhabited by an inadequate understanding of him/her-self. The truth of self lies in its interrelations to others in a rhizomic manner that defies dualistic modes of opposition. Reaching out for an adequate representation of oneself includes the process of clearing up the confusion concerning one's true nature as an affective, interconnected entity. Ultimately this implies understanding the bodily structure of the self. Because of this bodily nature, the process of self-consciousness is forever ongoing and therefore incomplete, or partial. This partiality is built into the nomadic understanding of the subject.

Bodily entities, in fact, are not passive, but rather dynamic and sensitive forces forever in motion which "form unities only through fragile synchronization of forces."¹⁴ This fragility concerns mostly the pitch of the synchronization efforts; the lines of demarcation between the different bodily boundaries, the borders that are the

thresholds of encounter and connection with other forces, the standard term for which is: *limitis*. Because of his monistic understanding of the subject, Spinoza sees bodily *limitis* as the limits of our awareness as well; this means that his theory of affectivity is connected to the physics of motion. Another word for Spinoza's *conatus* is therefore self-preservation, not in the liberal individualistic sense of the term, but rather as the actualization of one's essence, that is to say of one's ontological drive to become. This is not an automatic, nor an intrinsically harmonious process, insofar as it involves interconnection with other forces and consequently also conflicts and clashes. Negotiations have to occur as stepping-stones to sustainable flows of becoming. The bodily self's interaction with his/her environment can either increase or decrease that body's *conatus* or *potentia*. The mind as a sensor that prompts understanding can assist by helping to discern and choose those forces that increase its power of acting and its activity in both physical and mental terms. A higher form of self-knowledge by understanding the nature of one's affectivity is the key to a Spinozist ethics of empowerment. It includes a more adequate understanding of the interconnections between the self and a multitude of other forces, and it thus undermines the liberal individual understanding of the subject. It also implies, however, the body's ability to comprehend and to physically sustain a greater number of complex interconnections, and to deal with complexity without being overburdened. Thus, only an appreciation of complexity and of increasing degrees of complexity can guarantee the freedom of the mind in the awareness of its true, affective, and dynamic nature.

Thinking the unity of body and mind, sustainable ethics stresses the power ("potentia") of affects ("affectus"). Starting from the assumption that the property of substance is to express itself, the term "expression" implies "dynamic articulation"¹⁴ and not merely passive reflection: "*Affectus* refers to the passage from one state to another in the affected body – the increase or decrease in its powers of acting."¹⁵ This "power of acting" – which is in fact a flow of transpositions – is expressed by Spinoza in terms of achieving freedom through an adequate understanding of our passions and consequently of our bondage. Coming into possession of freedom requires the understanding of affects or passions by a mind that is always already embodied. The desire to reach an adequate

understanding of one's *potentia* is the human being's fundamental desire or *conatus*. An error of judgment is a form of misunderstanding [of the true nature of the subject] that results in decreasing the power, positivity, and activity of the subject. By extension: reason is affective, embodied, dynamic – understanding the passions is our way of experiencing them – and making them work in our favor. In this respect Spinoza argues that desires arise from our passions. Because of this, they can never be excessive – given that affectivity is the power that activates our body and makes it want to act. The human being's inbuilt tendency is towards joy and self-expression, not towards implosion. This fundamental positivity is the key to Deleuze's attachment to Spinoza.

Clearly, this implies a very non-moralistic understanding of ethics which focuses on the subject's powers to act and to express their dynamic and positive essence. An ethology stresses the field of composition of forces and affects, speed and transformation. In this perspective, ethics is the pursuit of self-preservation, which paradoxically assumes the dissolution of the self: what is good is what increases our power of acting and that is what we must strive for. This results not in egotism, but in mutually embedded nests of shared interests. Lloyd calls this: "a collaborative morality."¹⁶ Because the starting point for Spinoza is not the isolated individual, but complex and mutually depended co-realities, the self-other interaction also follows a different model. To be an individual means to be open to being affected by and through others, thus undergoing transformations in such a way as to be able to sustain them and make them work towards growth. The activity/passivity distinction is far more important than that between self and other, good and bad. What binds the two is the idea of interconnection and affectivity as the defining features of the subject. An ethical life pursues that which enhances and strengthens the subject without reference to transcendental values but rather in the awareness of one's interconnection with others.

This ethical project can be synthesized in the concept of a sustainable, non-unitary, perspectival self that aims at endurance. Endurance has a temporal dimension. It has to do with lasting in time; hence, duration and self-perpetuation (traces of Bergson here). But it also has a spatial side to do with the space of the body as an enfolded field of actualization of passions or forces. It evolves

affectivity and joy (traces of Spinoza), as in the capacity for being affected by these forces to the point of pain or extreme pleasure (which comes to the same). It may require putting up with and tolerating hardship and physical pain. It also entails the effort to move beyond it, to construct affirmative interaction. Apart from providing the key to an ethology of forces, endurance is also an ethical principle of affirmation of the positivity of the intensive subject, or in other words, its joyful affirmation as *potentia*. The subject is a spatio-temporal compound that frames the boundaries of processes of becoming. This works by transforming negative into positive passions through the power of an understanding that is no longer indexed upon a phallogocentric set of standards, but is rather relational and affective.

This turning of the tide of negativity is the transformative process of achieving freedom of understanding, through the awareness of our limits, of our bondage. This results in the freedom to affirm one's essence as joy, through encounters and mingling with other bodies, entities, beings, and forces. Ethics means faithfulness to this *potentia*, or the desire to become. Becoming is an intransitive process: it's not about becoming anything in particular, only what one is capable of and attracted to and capable of becoming. It's life on the edge, but not over it. It's not deprived of violence, but deeply commensurate. It's an ethical and political sensibility that begins with the recognition of one's limitations as the necessary counterpart of one's forces or intensive encounters with multiple others. It has to do with the adequacy of one's intensity to the modes and time of its enactment. It can only be empirically embodied and embedded, because it's interrelational and collective.

TRANSFORMATIVE ETHICS AND THE RELOCATION OF OTHERNESS

The core of Deleuze's ethical project therefore is a positive vision of the subject as a radically immanent, intensive body. That is, an assemblage of forces or flows, intensities, and passions that solidify in space and consolidate in time, within the singular configuration commonly known as a constituted entity or an "individual" self. This intensive and dynamic entity is rather a portion of forces that is stable enough to sustain and undergo constant though

non-destructive fluxes of transformation – a “dividual” self. It is the body’s degrees and levels of affectivity that determine the modes of differentiation. Joyful or positive passions and the transcendence of reactive affects are the desirable ethical relation. The emphasis on “immanence” and “becoming” implies a commitment to duration and, conversely, a rejection of self-destruction. Positivity is built into this program through the very idea of the immanence of matter and its self-organizing vitality. Life sets its own boundaries, or rather composes its ever-shifting folds of sustainable actualization of intensity.

Thus, an ethically empowering relation increases one’s *potentia* or empowering force and creates joyful energy in the process. The conditions that encourage such a quest are not only historical, they concern processes of transformation or self-fashioning in the direction of affirming positivity. Because all subjects share in this common nature, there is a common ground – the middle or the milieu – on which to negotiate the interests and the eventual conflicts.

This fundamentally positive vision of the ethical subject does not deny conflicts, tension, or even violent disagreements between or within different subjects. The legacy of Hegel’s critique of Spinoza is looming large here, notably the criticism that a Spinozist approach lacks a theory of negativity, which may adequately account for the complex logistics of interaction with others. This charge is moved against Deleuze today by the new theorists of the negative – notably Žižek and Badiou – whose residual Hegelianism is merely the prelude to nostalgic longings for neo-Leninist certainties. Against such micro-fascist discursive formations, Deleuzian ethics pleads simultaneously for an open ecology of immanence and the quest for actualization of the interactions that may sustain ethically affirmative relations.

It is simply not the case that the emphasis Deleuze places on the positivity of desire cancels or denies the tensions of conflicting interests. It merely displaces the grounds on which the negotiations take place from an individual to a transversal collectively constituted relational subject. The nomadic view of ethics takes place within a monistic ontology that sees subjects as modes of individuation within a common flow of *zoe*. Consequently there is no self–other distinction in the traditional mode, but variations of

intensities, assemblages set by affinities and complex synchronizations. This breaks the expectation of mutual reciprocity that is central to liberal individualism. Accepting the impossibility of mutual recognition and replacing it with one of mutual specification and mutual codependence is what is at stake in nomadic ethics of sustainability. This is against both the moral philosophy of rights and the humanistic tradition of making the anthropocentric Other into the privileged site and inescapable horizon of Otherness.

The Kantian imperative of not doing to others what you would not want done to you is not rejected as much as enlarged. In terms of the ethics of *conatus*, in fact, the harm that you do to others is immediately reflected in the harm you do to yourself, in terms of loss of *potentia*, positivity, self-awareness, and inner freedom. Moreover, the “others” in question are not just constituted human selves, but also non-anthropomorphic and planetary others. These include external and non-human forces: the environment as a whole – the earth – and hence also animals;¹⁷ cells;¹⁸ viruses and bacteria.¹⁹ This post-human ethics rests on a multi-layered form of relationality. It assumes as the point of reference not the individual, but the relation. This means openness to others, in the positive sense of affecting and being affected by others, through couples and mutually dependent co-realities. Containment of the other – as I suggested earlier – occurs through interrelational affectivity and the construction of common planes of actualization of projects and communities: it is a pragmatic praxis of immanent relations.

ENDURANCE AND NEGATIVE PASSIONS

The ethics of affirmation, with its emphasis on moving across the pain and transforming it into activity, may seem counterintuitive. In our culture people go to great lengths to ease all pain, but especially the pain of uncertainty about identity, origin, and belonging. Great distress follows from not knowing or not being able to articulate the source of one’s suffering, or from knowing it all too well, all the time. People who have been confronted by the irreparable, the unbearable, the insurmountable, the traumatic and inhuman event will do anything to find solace, resolution, and also compensation. The yearning for these measures – solace, closure, justice – is all too understandable and worthy of respect.

What is positive in the ethics of affirmation is the belief that negative affects can be transformed. This implies a dynamic view of all affects, even those that freeze us in pain, horror, or mourning. Affirmative nomadic ethics puts the motion back into e-motion and the active back into activism, introducing movement, process, and becoming. This shift makes all the difference to the patterns of repetition of negative emotions. What is negative about negative affects is not a value judgment (any more than it is for the positivity of difference), nor is it a psychologically depressed state. It rather concerns the effect of arrest, blockage, and rigidification that comes as a result of an act of violence, betrayal, a trauma – or which can be self-perpetuated through practices that our culture chastises as self-destructive: all forms of mild and extreme addictions, differing degrees of abusive practices that mortify the body, from food and alcohol binging to bodily scarring. Abusive, addictive, or destructive practices do not merely destroy the self but harm the self's capacity to relate to others, both human and non-human others. Thus they harm the capacity to grow in and through others and become others. Negative passions diminish our capacity to express the high levels of interdependence, the vital reliance on others, which is the key to a non-unitary and dynamic vision of the subject. What is negated by negative passions is the power of life itself, as the dynamic force, vital flows of connections and becomings (the nomadic intensity of *zoé*). This is why they should not be encouraged, nor should we be rewarded for lingering around them too long. Negative passions are black holes.

An ethics of affirmation involves the transformation of negative into positive passions: resentment into affirmation, as Nietzsche put it. The practice of reintroducing negative into positive passions is the process of reintroducing time, movement, and transformation into a stifling enclosure saturated with unprocessed pain. It is a gesture of affirmation beyond the sense of affirming the possibility of moving beyond the stultifying effects of the pain, the injury, the injustice. The displacement of the hurt is achieved through a sort of de-personalization of the event, which is the ultimate ethical challenge.

Moreover, the ethics of affirmation is about suspending the quest for claims and compensation, resisting the logic of retribution of rights and taking instead a different road. In order to understand

this move it is important to de-psychologize the discussion of affirmation. Let's keep in mind that affectivity is intrinsically understood as positive: it is the force that aims at fulfilling the subject's capacity for interaction and freedom. It is Spinoza's *conatus*, or the notion of *potentia* as the affirmative aspect of power. It is joyful and pleasure-prone, and it is immanent in that it coincides with the terms and modes of its expression. This means concretely that ethical behavior confirms, facilitates, and enhances the subject's *potentia*, as the capacity to express his/her freedom. The positivity of this desire to express one's innermost and constitutive freedom (*conatus*, *potentia*, or becoming) is conducive to ethical behavior, however, only if the subject is capable of making it endure, thus allowing it to sustain its own impetus. Unethical behavior achieves the opposite: it denies, hinders, and diminishes that impetus or is unable to sustain it. Affirmation is therefore not naive optimism or Candide-like unrealism. It is about endurance and transformation. Endurance is self-affirmation. It is also an ethical principle of affirmation of the positivity of the intensive subject – its joyful affirmation as *potentia*. The subject is a spatio-temporal compound which frames the boundaries of processes of becoming. This works by transforming negative into positive passions through the power of an understanding that is no longer indexed upon a phallogocentric set of standards, but is rather unhinged and therefore relational.

This sort of turning of the tide of negativity is the transformative process of achieving freedom of understanding through the awareness of our limits, of our bondage. This results in the freedom to affirm one's essence as joy, through encounters and mingling with other bodies, entities, beings, and forces. Ethics means faithfulness to this *potentia*, or the desire to become. Deleuze defines the latter with reference to Bergson's concept of "duration," thus proposing the notion of the subject as an entity that lasts, that endures sustainable changes and transformation and enacts them around him/herself in a community or collectivity. Affirmative ethics rests on the idea of sustainability as a principle of containment and tolerable development of a subject's resources,²¹ understood environmentally, socially and psychically, as argued by Félix Guattari in his analysis of the three fundamental ecologies of the post-humanist era.²² A subject thus constituted inhabits a time that is the active

tense of continuous "becoming." Endurance has therefore a temporal dimension: it has to do with lasting in time – hence duration and self-perpetuation. But it also has a spatial side to do with transversal relations and assemblages, as an enfolded field of actualization of passions or forces. It evolves affectivity and joy, as in the capacity for being affected by these forces, to the point of pain or extreme pleasure.

The point, however, is that extreme pleasure or extreme pain – which may score the same on a Spinozist scale of ethology of affects – are of course not the same. On the reactive side of the equation, endurance points to the struggle to sustain the pain without being annihilated by it. It also introduces a temporal dimension about duration in time. This is linked to memory: intense pain, a wrong, a betrayal, a wound are hard to forget. The traumatic impact of painful events fixes them in a rigid, eternal present tense out of which it is difficult to emerge. This is the eternal return of that which precisely cannot be endured and returns in the mode of the unwanted, the untimely, the unassimilated or inappropriate/d. They are also, however, paradoxically difficult to remember, insofar as remembering will entail retrieval and repetition of the pain itself.

Psychoanalysis had shown the way through the notion of the return of the repressed as it is the key to the logic of unconscious remembrance.³¹ It inscribed it, however, within a metaphysics of lack and within the knotted time span or spasm of the symptom, which is always indexed on a traumatic past whose negative legacy undermines the very thinkability of sustainable futures and hence also of an affirmative present. Kristeva's notion of the abject expresses clearly the circular temporality involved in psychoanalysis – by stressing the structural function played by the negative, the incomprehensible, the unthinkable, the other of understandable knowledge.³² Deleuze, on the other hand, calls this alterity "Chaos," and defines it ontologically as the virtual formation of all possible form, whereas Lacan – and Derrida with him – defines Chaos epistemologically as that which precedes form, structure, and language. This makes for two radically divergent conceptions of time and negativity. That which is incomprehensible for Lacan, following Hegel, is the virtual for Deleuze, following Spinoza, Bergson, and Leibniz.

This produces a number of significant shifts: from negative to affirmative; from entropic to generative; from the incomprehensible, meaningless, or unrepresented to the virtual waiting to be actualized; from constitutive outsides to a geometry of affects that require mutual synchronization; from a melancholy and split to a productive and open-ended web-like subject; from the epistemological to the ontological turn in ethics.

It also introduces a temporal dimension into the discussion that leads to the very conditions of possibility of a sustainable future, to futurity as such. For an ethics of sustainability, the expression of positive affects is that which makes the subject last or endure. It is like a source of long-term energy at the affective core of subjectivity.³³ The eternal return in Nietzsche is the repetition, yet neither in the compulsive mode of neurosis nor in the negative erasure that marks the traumatic event. It is the eternal return of and as positivity.³⁴ This kind of ethics addresses the affective structure of pain and suffering but does not locate the ethical instance within it, be it in the mode of compassionate witnessing or empathic co-presence.³⁷ In a nomadic, Deleuzian–Nietzschean perspective, ethics is essentially about the transformation of negative into positive passions, that is, about moving beyond the pain. This does not mean denying the pain but rather activating it, working it through. Again, the positivity here is not supposed to indicate a facile optimism or a careless dismissal of human suffering.

Contrary to the traditional morality that follows a rationalist and legalistic model and interprets the wrongs one suffered within a logic of responsibility, claim, and compensation, affirmative ethics rests on the notion of the random access to the phenomena that cause pain (or pleasure). This is not fatalism, and even less resignation, but rather *amor fati*. The difference is crucial: we have to be worthy of what happens to us and rework it within an ethics of relation, without falling into negativity. Of course, repugnant and unbearable events do happen. Ethics consists, however, in reworking these events in the direction of positive relations. This is not carelessness or lack of compassion, but rather a form of lucidity that acknowledges the impossibility of finding an adequate answer to the question about the possible meaning of the ill fate, the painful event, and even of the violence suffered. Acknowledging the futility of even trying to answer that question is a starting point.

LIMITS AND THRESHOLDS

The dissolution of the hard-core self of liberal individualism is a foundational notion in poststructuralist philosophy. Foucault, for instance, rendered it through the idea of the "limit-experience" which breaks the frame of predictable subject positions. Deleuze pursues this line, influenced by Baraille, Blanchot, as well as Nietzsche. The point of dissolution of the subject is usually marked by confrontation with an extreme experience, which leads to de-subjectivation. The fragility and vulnerability of the human is revealed in this experience, which concerns both affect and cognition. As a limit-experience it marks the threshold of (un)sustainability, that is, it prompts the awareness of fragility and the recognition of contingency. It also propels the subject, however, to act according to this awareness. The result of the confrontation with the limit (the limit-experience) is the transformation of the subject's relation to knowledge and to itself as a knowing subject. The limit experience accounts for the conversion of the subject into something else. This is the ethical moment.

The later Foucault argues, contrary, for instance, to Deleuze, that the question of the limits of the philosophical subject, which is operationalized through Baraille, was already raised by Kant's critical thought. This is expressed in both *Preface to Transgression* and in Foucault's genealogy of the human and social sciences in *The Order of Discourse*. Through this reference, Foucault links the domain of ethics to knowledge and cognition in the sense of forces that activate a subject's capacity to act upon itself and others (*potentia*). This is self-styling or *auto-poiesis* as productive self-creation. Ethics as praxis.

Ethics is about freedom from the weight of negativity, freedom through the understanding of our bondage. A certain amount of pain, the knowledge about vulnerability and pain, is actually useful. It forces one to think about the actual material conditions of being interconnected and thus being in the world. It frees one from the stupidity of perfect health, and the full-blown sense of existential entitlement that comes with it.

What is ethics, then? Ethics is a thin barrier against the possibility of extinction. It is a mode of actualizing sustainable forms of transformation. This requires adequate assemblages or interaction:

one has to pursue or actively create the kind of encounters that are likely to favor an increase in active becomings and avoid those that diminish one's *potentia*. It is an intensive ethics, based on the shared capacity of humans to feel empathy for, develop affinity with, and hence enter in relation with other forces, entities, beings, waves of intensity. This requires dosage, rhythms, styles of repetition, and coordination or resonance. It is a matter of unfolding-out and enfolding-in the complex and multi-layered forces of *bios-zoe* as a deeply inhuman force.

In other words, *potentia*, in order to fulfill its inherent positivity, must be "formatted" in the direction of sustainability. Obviously, this means that it is impossible to set one standard that will suit all; a differential approach becomes necessary. What bodies are capable of doing or not is biologically, physically, psychologically, historically, sexually, and emotionally specific: singular and hence partial. Consequently, the thresholds of sustainable becomings also mark their limits. In this respect "I can't take it anymore" is an ethical statement, not the assertion of defeat. It is the lyrical lament of a subject in process who is shot through with waves of intensity, like a set of fulgurations that illuminate his self-awareness, tearing open fields of self-knowledge in the encounter of and configuration with others. Learning to recognize threshold, borders, or limits is thus crucial to the work of the understanding and to the process of becoming. For Lacan limits are wounds or scars, marks of internal lacerations and irreplaceable losses, and for liberal thoughts limits are frontiers that cannot be trespassed without the required visas or permissions. For Deleuze, however, limits are simultaneously points of passage or thresholds and markers of sustainability.

Deleuze has an almost mathematical definition of the limit, as that which one never really reaches. In his *Abécédaire*, Deleuze discusses with Claire Parnet the question of the limit in terms of addiction. Reminiscing on his own early alcoholism, Deleuze notes that the limit or frame for the alterations induced by alcohol is to be set with reference not so much to the last glass, because that is the glass that is going to kill you. What matters instead is the "second-last" glass, the one that has already been and thus is going to allow you to survive, to last, to endure – and consequently also to go on drinking again. A true addict stops at the second-last glass, one removed from the fatal sip, or shot. A death-bound entity,

however, usually shoots straight for the last one. That gesture prevents or denies the expression of the desire to start again tomorrow, that is to say to repeat that "second-last shot," and thus to endure. In fact, there is no sense of a possible tomorrow: time folds in upon itself and excavates a black hole into which the subject dissolves. No future.

THE ETHICS OF DE-PERSONALIZATION

Pain in our culture is associated to suffering by force of habit and tradition and is given negative connotations accordingly. Supposing we look a bit more critically into this associative link, however: what does pain, or suffering, tell us? That our subjectivity consists of affectivity, interrelationality, and forces. The core of the subject is affect and the capacity for interrelations to affect and to be affected. Let us agree to de-psychologize this discussion from this moment on, not in order to deny the pain, but rather to find ways of working through it.

This vision of ethics involves a radical repositioning or internal transformation on the part of subjects who want to become-minoritarian in a productive and affirmative manner. It is clear that this shift requires changes that are neither simple nor self-evident. They mobilize the affectivity of the subjects involved and can be seen as a process of transformation of negative into positive passions. Fear, anxiety, and nostalgia are clear examples of the negative emotions involved in the project of detaching ourselves from familiar and cherished forms of identity. To achieve a post-identity or non-unitary vision of the self requires the dis-identification from established references. Such an enterprise involves a sense of loss of cherished habits of thought and representation, and thus is not free of pain. No process of consciousness-raising ever is.

The beneficial side-effects of this process are unquestionable and in some way they compensate for the pain of loss. Thus, the feminist questioning and in some cases rejection of gender roles triggers a process of dis-identification with established forms of masculinity and femininity, which has fueled the political quest for alternative ways of inhabiting gender and embodying sexuality.³⁶ In race discourse, the awareness of the persistence of racial discrimination and of white privilege has led, on the one hand, to the critical

reappraisal of blackness³⁷ and, on the other, to radical relocation of whiteness.³⁸

In a Spinozist vein, these are transformative processes that not only rework the consciousness of social injustice and discrimination but also produce a more adequate cartography of our real-life condition, free of delusions of grandeur. It is an enriching and positive experience which, however, includes pain as an integral element. Migrants, exiles, refugees have firsthand experience of the extent to which the process of dis-identification from familiar identities is linked to the pain of loss and uprooting. Diasporic subjects of all kinds express the same sense of wound. Multi-locality is the affirmative translation of this negative sense of loss. Following Glissant, the becoming-nomadic marks the process of positive transformation of the pain of loss into the active production of multiple forms of belonging and complex allegiances.³⁹ What is lost in the sense of fixed origins is regained in an increased desire to belong, in a multiple rhizomic manner which transcends the classic bilateralism of binary identity formations.

The qualitative leap through pain, across the mournful landscapes of nostalgic yearning, is the gesture of active creation of affirmative ways of belonging. It is a fundamental reconfiguration of our way of being in the world, which acknowledges the pain of loss but moves further. This is the defining moment for the process of becoming-ethical: the move across and beyond pain, loss, and negative passions. Taking suffering into account is the starting point; the real aim of the process, however, is the quest for ways of overcoming the stultifying effects of passivity, brought about by pain. The internal disarray, fracture, and pain are the conditions of possibility for ethical transformation. Clearly, this is an antithesis of the Kantian moral imperative to avoid pain or to view pain as the obstacle to moral behavior. Nomadic ethics is not about the avoidance of pain; rather it is about transcending the resignation and passivity that ensue from being hurt, lost, and dispossessed. One has to become ethical, as opposed to applying moral rules and protocols as a form of self-protection. Transformations express the affirmative power of life as the vitalism of *bios-zoe*.

The sobering experience – the humble and productive recognition of loss, limitations, and shortcomings – has to do with self-representations. Established mental habits, images, and terminology

railroad us back towards established ways of thinking about ourselves. Traditional modes of representation are legal forms of addition. To change them is not unlike undertaking a disintoxication cure. A great deal of courage and creativity is needed to develop forms of representation that do justice to the complexities of the kind of subjects we have already become. De-familiarization is an essential component of this process. The point is that de-personalization is a necessary step on the road to the acquisition of ethical subjectivity because it bypasses the spiral of negative passions and the political economy of resentment which lies at the heart of the ego. The necessity to undergo such a fundamental transformation of our system of self-understanding as subject is also supported by contextual concerns. We already live and inhabit social reality in ways that surpass tradition: we move about, in the flow of current social transformations, in hybrid, multicultural, polyglot, post-identity spaces of becoming.¹⁸ We fail, however, to bring them into adequate representation. There is a shortage on the part of our social imaginary, a deficit of representational power, which underscores the political timidity of our times.

BECOMING ETHICAL: ON SUSTAINABILITY

What is, then, the subject of ethical affirmation? It is a slice of living, sensible matter activated by a fundamental drive to life: a *potentia* (rather than *potestas*) – neither by the will of God, nor the secret encryption of the genetic code – and yet this subject is embedded in the corporeal materiality of the self. The enfolded intensive or nomadic subject is rather a transversal entity: a folding-in of external influences and a simultaneous unfolding-outwards of affects. A mobile unit in space and time and therefore an enfolded kind of memory, this subject is not only in process, but is also capable of lasting through sets of discontinuous variations, while remaining extraordinarily faithful to itself.

This idea of the “faithfulness” of the subject is important and it builds on the rejection of liberal individualism. This may appear counterintuitive to the Anglo-American reader and require of them an effort of the imagination. Allow me to plead for the short-term benefits that will flow, however, from this stretching exercise, and for the dividends it will return in terms of added understanding.

This “faithfulness to oneself” consequently, is not to be understood in the mode of the psychological or sentimental attachment to a personal “identity” that often is little more than a social security number and a set of photo albums. Nor is it the mark of authenticity of a self (“me, myself and I”) that is a clearinghouse for narcissism and paranoia – the great pillars on which Western identity predicated itself. It is rather the faithfulness of mutual sets of interdependence and interconnections, that is to say, sets of relations and encounters. It is a play of complexity that encompasses all levels of one’s multi-layered subjectivity, binding the cognitive to the emotional, the intellectual to the affective and connecting them all to a socially embedded ethics of sustainability. Thus, the faithfulness that is at stake in nomadic ethics coincides with the awareness of one’s condition of interaction with others, that is to say, one’s capacity to affect and to be affected. Translated into a temporal scale, this is the faithfulness of duration, the expression of one’s continuing attachment to certain dynamic spatio-temporal coordinates.

In a philosophy of temporally inscribed radical immanence, subjects differ. But they differ along materially embedded coordinates, because they come in different mileage, temperatures, and beats. One can and does change gears and move across these coordinates, but cannot claim all of them, all of the time. The latitudinal and longitudinal forces that structure the subject have limits of sustainability. By latitudinal forces Deleuze means the affects a subject is capable of, following the degrees of intensity or potency: how intensely they run. By longitude is meant the span of extension: how far they can go. Sustainability is about how much of it a subject can take.

In other words, sustainable subjectivity reinscribes the singularity of the self, while challenging the anthropocentrism of Western philosophies’ understanding of the subject, and of the attributes usually reserved for “agency.” This sense of limits is extremely important to ensure productive synchronizations and prevent nihilistic self-destruction. To be active, intensive, or nomadic does not mean that one is limitless. That would be the kind of delirious expression of megalomania that you find in the new master narratives of the cyber-culture of today, ready and willing to: “dissolve the bodily self into the matrix.” On the contrary, to make sense of this intensive, materially embedded vision of the subject we need a sustainability

threshold or frame. The containment of the intensities or enfolded passions so as to ensure their duration is a crucial prerequisite to allow them to do their job, which consists in shooting through the humanistic frame of the subject, exploding it outwards. The dosage of the threshold of intensity is both crucial and inherent to the process of becoming, insofar as the subject is embodied and hence set in a spatio-temporal frame.

What is this threshold of sustainability, then, and how does it get fixed? A radically immanent intensive body is an assemblage of forces, or flows, intensities, and passions that solidify in space, and consolidate in time, within the singular configuration commonly known as an "individual" self. This intensive and dynamic entity – it's worth stressing it again – does not coincide with the enumeration of inner rationalist laws, nor is it merely the unfolding of genetic data and information. It is rather a portion of forces that is stable enough to sustain and to undergo constant, though non-destructive, fluxes of transformation. D. W. Smith argues that there are three essential questions about immanent ethics: "How is a mode of existence determined? How are modes of existence to be evaluated? What are the conditions for the creation of new modes of existence?"³ On all three scores, it is the body's degrees and levels of affectivity that determined the modes of differentiation. Joyful or positive passions and the transcendence of reactive affects are the desirable mode. The emphasis on "existence" implies a commitment to duration and conversely a rejection of self-destruction. Positivity is inbuilt into this program through the idea of thresholds of sustainability.

Thus, an ethically empowering option increases one's *potentia* and creates joyful energy in the process. The conditions which can encourage such a quest are not only historical; they all concern processes of self-transformation or self-fashioning in the direction of affirming positivity. Because all subjects share in this common nature, there is a common ground on which to negotiate the interests and the eventual conflicts. It is important to see in fact that this fundamentally positive vision of the ethical subject does not deny conflicts, tension, or even violent disagreements between different subjects. Again, the legacy of Hegel's critique of Spinoza is still looming large here. It is simply not the case that the positivity of desire cancels or denies the tensions of conflicting interests. It

merely displaces the grounds on which the negotiations take place. The Kantian imperative of not doing to others what you would not want done to you is not rejected as much as enlarged. In terms of the ethics of *conatus*, in fact, the harm that you do to others is immediately reflected in the harm you do to yourself, in terms of loss of *potentia*, positivity, self-awareness, and inner freedom.

This move away from the Kantian vision of an ethics that obliges people, and especially women, natives, and others, to act morally in the name of a transcendent standard or a universal moral rule is not a simple one. I defend it as a forceful answer to the complexities of our historical situation: it is a move towards radical immanence against all Platonist and classical humanistic denials of embodiment, matter, and the flesh. Containing the other in the name of one's right to differ, or in the name of the vital powers of becoming. They stress that moral reasoning locates the constitution of subjectivity in the interrelation to others, which is a form of exposure, availability, and vulnerability. This recognition entails the necessity of containing the other, the suffering and the enjoyment of others in the expression of the intensity of our affective streams.

If the point of ethics is to explore how much a body can do, in the pursuit of active modes of empowerment through experimentation, how do we know when we have gone too far? How does one know if one has reached the threshold of sustainability? This is where the non-individualistic vision of the subject as embodied and hence affective and interrelational, but also fundamentally social, is of major consequence. Your body will thus tell you if and when you have reached a threshold or a limit. The warning can take the form of opposing resistance; falling ill, feeling nauseous, or it can take other somatic manifestations, like fear, anxiety, or a sense of insecurity. Whereas the semiotic-linguistic frame of psychoanalysis reduces these to symptoms awaiting interpretation, I see them as corporeal warning signals or boundary markers that express a clear message: "too much!" One of the reasons why Deleuze and Guattari are so interested in studying self-destructive or pathological modes of behaviors, such as schizophrenia, masochism, anorexia, various forms of addiction, and the black hole of murderous violence, is precisely in order to explore their function as markers of thresholds. This assumes a qualitative distinction between, on the one hand, the desire that propels the subject's expression of his/her *conatus*,

which in a neo-Spinozist perspective is implicitly positive in that it expresses the essential best of the subject, and, on the other, the constraints imposed by society. The specific, contextually determined conditions are the forms in which the desire is actualized or actually expressed.

This is all the more salient if we consider that advanced capitalism is a system that tends to constantly stretch its limits and plays with the idea of over-reaching itself, moving towards "timeless time."³⁴ How shall I put it? All planes are always overbooked, and this is a fitting metaphor for the political economy of profit and its saturation of our social space. Insofar as the subject is under constant pressure to function and find points of stability within the ever-shifting limits or boundaries, capitalism is a system that actively generates schizophrenia in the sense of enhancing the value of unfixd meanings: an unlimited semiosis without fixed referents.³⁵ This makes the question of negotiation thresholds of sustainability all the more urgent. If the boundaries are forever being stretched and hence blurred, however, perspectival shifts are necessary in order to keep up and account for the process and thus identify points of resistance. Schizophrenia is a molecular mode of undoing the molar aggregates of the commodification system, of inducing flows into them. This avoids the consolidation and the over-codification (constant control) that are characteristic of the Majority, but in return it runs the danger of fluidity to the point of self-destruction. How to find a point of balance is an ethical question.

CONCLUSION

A nomadic Deleuzian ethics prioritizes relation, praxis, and complexity as the key components and it accordingly promotes a triple shift. Firstly, it continues to emphasize a radical ethics of transformation in opposition to the moral protocols of Kantian universalism. Secondly, it shifts the focus from a unitary and rationality-driven consciousness to ontology of process, that is to say, a vision of subjectivity that is propelled by affects and relations. Thirdly, it disengages the emergence of the subject from the logic of negation and attaches subjectivity to affirmative Otherness – reciprocity as creation, not as the recognition of Sameness. This results in renewed

emphasis on affirmation as the politics of life itself, as the generative intensive force of *zoe*.

In response to the charge of moral relativism, I have emphasized the central role of sustainability in nomadic ethics. Sustainable ethics allows us to contain the risks while pursuing the original project of transformation. This is a way to resist the dominant ethos of our conservative times that idolizes the new as a consumerist trend, while thundering against those who believe in social change. Cultivating the art of living intensely in the pursuit of change is a political act. In this regard, I have insisted on the importance of endurance – in the double sense of learning to last in time, but also to put up and live with pain and suffering. Again, it is a question of dosage and of balance. Thresholds of sustainability need to be mapped out, so that a rate and speed of change can be negotiated and set that will allow each subject to endure, to go on, to stop at the second-last smoke, shot, drink, and book. This implies a differential type of ethics, which clashes with dominant morality but contains criteria for the section of the ethical relation and a regard for the limits. These need to be set by experimentation with the collectively shared intensities of a community that longs for the activation of affirmative forces and hence require careful negotiations. The embodied structure of the subject is a limit in itself, though limits in Deleuze's philosophy are just the threshold of sustainable changes.

The key ideals of this ethics of freedom are, firstly, the focus on self-determination or self-styling through the very acts of resistance or transgression. This is in contrast to the juridical conception of freedom as a set of universal rights or entitlements. Secondly, this idea of freedom emphasizes critical analysis and constant questioning. This is linked to the notion of governmentality in the sense of a general organization of knowledge and of disciplinary apparatus that produce modes of subjectivity.³⁶ The lesson of Spinoza about the structurally repressive function of the state in relation to the project of realizing the *conatus* is also relevant. This tradition of thought, to which Toni Negri also belongs, is wary of the institutions that govern us. Thus vigilance is the price of freedom, it is the task of the critical thinkers, as analysts of power, to assess the conditions that are conducive to social change, as opposed to the emphasis on unchangeable factors.

Thirdly, the issue of self-scrutiny cannot be separated from the social analysis of the conditions of domination. A micropolitics of resistance can be seen as a web of emancipatory practices. Localized and concrete ethical gestures and political activities matter more than grand overarching projects. In this respect, nomadic theory is a form of ethical pragmatism.

NOTES

- 1 See Nicholas Rose, "The Politics of Life Itself," *Theory, Culture and Society*, 18:6 (2001), 1–30, and Paul Rabinow, *Anthropos Today* (Princeton University Press, 2003).
- 2 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford University Press, 1998).
- 3 Emmanuel Levinas, *Alterity and Transcendence* (London: Athlone, 1999).
- 4 See Simon Critchley, *The Ethics of Deconstruction* (Edinburgh University Press, 1992), and Judith Butler, *Precarious Life* (London and New York: Verso, 2004).
- 5 Jacques Derrida, *The Work of Mourning* (University of Chicago Press, 2001).
- 6 Keith Ansell Pearson, *Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition* (New York: Routledge, 1997) and *Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
- 7 Rosi Braidotti, *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).
- 8 Genevieve Lloyd, *Part of Nature: Self-Knowledge in Spinoza's "Ethics"* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) and *Spinoza and the "Ethics"* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
- 9 Ansell Pearson, *Viroid Life*.
- 10 Lloyd, *Part of Nature and Spinoza and the "Ethics"*.
- 11 Lloyd, *Spinoza and the "Ethics"*, p. 23.
- 12 Lloyd, *Part of Nature*, p. 12.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 23.
- 14 Lloyd, *Spinoza and the "Ethics"*, p. 31.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 72.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 74.
- 17 Donna Haraway, *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness* (Chicago: Prickley Paradigm Press, 2003).
- 18 Sarah Franklin, Celia Lury, and Jackie Stacey, *Global Nature, Global Culture* (London: Sage, 2000).

- 19 Vandana Shiva, *Biopiracy. The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge* (Boston: South End Press, 1997).
- 20 Luciana Parisi, *Abstract Sex. Philosophy, Biotechnology, and the Mutations of Desire* (London: Continuum, 2004), and Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan, *What is Life?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
- 21 Braidotti, *Transpositions*.
- 22 Felix Guattari, *The Three Ecologies* (London: Athlone, 2000).
- 23 Jean Laplanche, *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
- 24 Julia Kristeva, *Pouvoirs de l'horreur* (Paris: Seuil, 1980).
- 25 Elizabeth Grosz, *The Nick of Time* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).
- 26 Ansell Pearson, *Germinal Life*.
- 27 Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) and *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
- 28 Rosi Braidotti, *Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002) and *Transpositions*.
- 29 Paul Gilroy, *Against Race. Imagining Political Culture beyond the Colour Line* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), and Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought. Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991).
- 30 Gabriele Griffin and Rosi Braidotti, *Thinking Differently. A Reader in European Women's Studies* (London: Zed Books, 2002).
- 31 Édouard Glissant, *Poétique de la relation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1990).
- 32 Braidotti, *Metamorphoses and Transpositions*.
- 33 D. W. Smith, "The Place of Ethics in Deleuze's Philosophy: Three Questions of Immanence," in Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Heller (eds.), *Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics and Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 251–69, p. 259.
- 34 Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
- 35 Eugene Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari's "Anti-Oedipus": Introduction to Schizoanalysis* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
- 36 Thomas Dumm, *Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom* (London: Sage, 1996).

